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Introduction
1 The  complexity  of  hazard  networks  has  increased  as  technical  innovation  improves
methods  of  communication  between  stakeholders.  Iceland’s  network  of  agencies,
designed to both monitor and respond to volcanic events, is an example of this trend.
Hazard networks are entities within which stakeholders and agencies communicate at
nodal points through the sharing of information (Kamal, 2015; Tucker, 2015). The nodal
points  in  the  Icelandic  network  have  evolved  in  response  to  new  communication
practices, which have redefined the mitigation efforts of agencies such as the Icelandic
Meteorological Office (IMO) and the Icelandic Civil Protection before, during and after
eruptive  events.  This  evolutionary  process  has  repositioned  where  in  the  network
communication takes  place,  leading to  a  redefinition of  its  configuration of  agencies
(Guffanti  & Tupper,  2014).  Iceland is  an  example  of  a  hazard network within  which
transparency has led to greater coherence amongst stakeholders from different agencies,
and where the co-production of knowledge from both scientific and social perspectives
has resulted in information being conveyed in a manner that is reflective of the network
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as  a  whole.  Coherence  and  co-production  have  encouraged  collaborative  relations
between stakeholders, largely by merging the practices of different agency clusters. Most
academic research tends to focus upon the network’s monitoring and response practices
during a particular event, such as the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull in 2010, rather than
explaining how the network evolves between crises. Temporality is significant as it shows
how technology has enhanced communication and how stakeholders have become more
attached or isolated as a result. 
 
Research aims and intentions
2 Motivation for conducting this research emerged from both a desire to bridge the gap
between social science and hazard management, and the need to shed light upon how
technology sociologically transforms hazard and risk networks. The research conducted
in Iceland questioned: 
• How  trusted  interactions  affect  the  sociology  of  different  stakeholder  communities  in
Iceland’s volcanic hazard network? 
• How  advances  in  monitoring  and  response  technology  between  volcanic  events  have
reshaped channels of communication?
3 So, firstly, the research intended to identify and critique the methods through which
trusted  interactions  are  established,  maintained  and  reinforced  by  monitoring  and
response agencies that have contrasting scientific and/or social interests. Secondly, it
aimed to account for the impact of technical innovation and evaluate the extent to which
this has affected patterns of communication between volcanic events. Identification of
changes in the agency structure, and links to sociology, were the intended outcomes of
the  research,  particularly  highlighting  developments  in  distributed  decision-making,
inter-agency  trust,  and  the  uses  of  social  media  and  crowdsourcing.  The  research
provides  a  processual  narrative  for  its  case  study,  documenting and evaluating both
network  and  stakeholder  changes.  In  so  doing,  it  contrasts  with  previous  academic
critiques of management practices that often disproportionately focus upon the negative
elements of stakeholder contestation, risk perception, and conflicts with science. Here, an
understanding of the actual process through which hazard management practices evolve
is researched. Past experience, and the frequent occurrence of eruptive events in Iceland,
demonstrates  the  need  for  exhaustive  research  that  accommodates  both  social  and
scientific interpretations. This study explores those evolving, technologically mitigated,
practices that are changing the structure of Iceland’s network, identifying inter-agency
partnerships and the reorganisation of stakeholder communities. 
Research context
4 A succession of catastrophic events, such as Iceland’s Eyjafjallajökull eruption (Guffanti et
al., 2012; Bonadonna, 2014) and the Haiti Earthquake, have illustrated the need for greater
sociological research on extreme natural hazards in developed and developing contexts.
Hazardous environments are too complex for scientists to manage alone (Kendra & Nigg,
2014; De Marchi, 2015) and a multidisciplinary approach is required, potentially allowing
for the incorporation of the “Science and Technology Studies” field (Jasanoff 2004, 2010), and
within it, “Social Constructivism” (Stirling, 2008; Bijker et al., 2012). Here, Latour’s “Actor-
Network Theory” (Latour, 1999, 2005) (ANT) appears to be of particular relevance as it
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allows for a deconstruction of the network, illustrating the communication channels that
exist  between stakeholders,  whilst  also  helping  to  explain  and  theorise  the  changes




5 The involvement of the public in scientific practises has furthered the potentialities of co-
produced knowledge. Technical innovation has been a key to the reframing of knowledge
emerging from scientists and the public working together to shape the understanding of
an event or issue. According to Lane et al.:
“Knowledge  is  co-produced  through  a  process  of  dynamic,  collective  learning
involving those for whom an issue is of particular concern.” (Lane et al., 2011, p. 18)
6 Both  Lane  et  al. (2011)  and  Landström  et  al. (2011)  expand  this  definition  by
contextualising co-production through the knowledge, representation and outcomes of
flood risk management, in the process repositioning the roles of scientists and the lay
public. Outlining co-productive practices, such as participatory modelling, Landström et
al. (2011)  illustrate  the  bridging  of  knowledge  gaps  and  the  strengthening  of
communication  processes  that  allow  for  a  better  transfer  of  both  information  and
knowledge. Expanding upon the role of technology, Stirling (2008) implies that merging
scientists  and  the  public  through  co-production  influences  the  cultivation  of  socio-
technical knowledge. This study shows how practices that enhance co-production and




7 Jasanoff’s  explanation  of  “techno-science” (Jasanoff,  2010,  p.  6) ,  and  Bijker’s  “Social
Construction of Technology” approach (Bijker et al., 2012) imply that knowledge cannot be
coherently communicated when science, society or technology are assessed in isolation,
as this leads to the transfer of partial knowledge:
“Technological  innovation  would  not  be  possible  without  scientific  problem-
solving; nor could scientific discovery be imagined without technological means to
enable new experimental methods and approaches.” (Jasanoff, 2010, p. 6)
8 However, the need for knowledge exchange to be scientifically true, reliable in a technical
sense,  and understandable to different social  publics,  means that the construction of
coherent  models,  representations  and  systems  is  challenging,  but  can  be  furthered
through the recognition of “knowledge controversies” following a disturbance to society
(Whatmore, 2009, p. 587). Knowledge controversies are interpreted as “generative events”
(Whatmore, 2009, p. 588) by scholars such as Callon and Latour since they can lead to
greater public  engagement with science,  use of  technology,  and democratic  forms of
decision-making. Knowledge controversies facilitate the transfer of knowledge by leading
to  a  redistribution  of  expertise,  and  by  provoking  collaboration  between  “scientists
(natural and social) and affected publics” (Whatmore, 2009, p. 592). This paper explores the
role of knowledge controversies in the evolution of Iceland’s volcanic hazard network. 
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Hazard networks, nodes and evolutions
9 As hazard networks become more collaborative, the number of channels through which
to  communicate  data  and  information  expands.  The  network  itself  become  so
interconnected that nodes form, namely points that coordinate agencies providing and
receiving data. Exchanging data through platforms such as a “Sensor Network Server” (Hart
and Martinez, 2006, p. 178),  and the conveyance of information at critical points,  are
processes  through  which  hazard  monitoring  and  response  are  managed.  Seismic
networks  provide  the  best  illustration  as  configurations  of  algorithms  and  wireless
sensors dictate the positioning of data nodes (Pereira et al., 2014; Fernandez-Steeger et al.,
2015), as evident in the networks of volcanic observatories in Ecuador (Welsh, 2006). Data
nodes  are  rarely  stable  and  can  be  repositioned  in  response  to  crises  or  technical
innovation.  In fact,  changes in technology,  media,  stakeholders and data can lead to
wholescale transformations within networks,  integrating science and society at  nodal
points  where  information  is  transferred.  An  evolving  network  is  influenced  by
participation, which allows for the “flexibility to continuously modify goals as participants
better realise their needs” (Cronin et al., 2004, p. 113). This study employs these ideas to




10 ANT is a sociological approach to networked geographies; it establishes and deconstructs
interconnections between actors, the material and conceptual components of a network
(Law,  1999).  ANT does  not  privilege  a  particular  type  of  actor,  human or  technical.
However, Latour views technology as an influential “agent” that can provide and enhance
“mobilized” and “connected lines” of communication (Latour, 1993, p. 118). According to
Latour, connections between actors are traceable:
“Every branching, every alignment, every connection can be documented, since it
generates tracers.” (Latour, 1993, p. 118)
11 Technology directs interconnectivity, holds network’s together, and also creates a trace,
such  as  emails  or  messages  that  identify  points  of  connection.  As  information  is
communicated, it becomes less pure as it is translated by the actors that connect with it:
“Actors  (1)  construct  common  definitions  and  meanings  (2),  define
representativities,  and  (3)  co-opt  each  other  in  the  pursuit  of  individual  and
collective objectives.” (Bardini, 1997, p. 516)
12 Thus, a network evolves and adapts, depending upon the actors within it at any time;
they  cluster  into  agency  structures,  with  information  ideally  bridging  actors  from
scientific, social and technical backgrounds. 
 
Study site: Iceland
13 This study aims to analyse critically the evolution of Iceland’s hazard network between
different  volcanic  events.  The study uses  social  theory to  illustrate  how trustworthy
interactions influence the dynamics of monitoring and response agencies; and to evaluate
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technology’s impact upon communication channels between volcanic events, in a hazard
and risk context that is continually evolving, both technically and socially. 
 
Icelandic relations with the UK
14 Disruption caused by the Eyjafjallajökull eruption in 2010 (Budd et al., 2011, Swindles et al.,
2013),  and the global  attention it  received (Burgess,  2012),  led to  both the Icelandic
network being reconfigured at  different scales,  and the development of  collaborative
practises  that  exploited new technical  capabilities.  The role and actions of  UK based
agencies,  such  as  the  London  VAAC  (Volcanic  Ash  Advisory  Centre),  are  of  particular
relevance (Parker, 2015). The London VAAC manage and distribute data that illustrates
the dispersion of airborne ash from Icelandic volcanoes, using “Numerical Atmospheric-
dispersion Modelling Environment” (NAME) technology (Jones et al., 2007). As demonstrated
in  2010,  Europe  is  particularly  vulnerable  to  volcanic  activity  in  Iceland.  The  UK’s
National  Risk  Register  recognises  that  both  explosive  and  effusive  hazards  present
significant natural threats, despite their non-domestic location (National Risk Register,
2015).
 
Figure 1. The Meteorological Office’s (London VAAC, 2014) role in communicating hazard
information with agencies in Iceland.
15 This vulnerability provided the political, social and financial incentive for the UK to take
part in coordinated monitoring exercises, such as VOLCICE (VOLcanic ash crisis exercise in
ICEland), which was conducted jointly by the IMO (Icelandic Meteorological Office, 2014),
London VAAC (2014) and Icelandic Aviation Service (Isavia). Icelandic volcanoes present a
regional  hazard  that,  to  be  managed,  requires  collaborative  engagement  between
Icelandic and UK based agencies (Reuter, 2014). Figure 1 details the role of the London
VAAC. 
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16 Icelandic  volcanoes  continue  to  threaten  European  aviation.  Even  a  medium  scale
eruption can have major socio-economic consequences when ash is blown in a southerly
direction (Figure 2).  The eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull  in 2010,  and Grímsvötn in 2011,
highlighted hazard communication and management deficiencies and fostered the uptake
of new technology (Johnson and Jeunemaitre, 2011). 
 
Figure 2. Extract from a VOLCICE monitoring exercise, illustrating the modelled spread of projected
movements of volcanic ash.
Icelandic Meteorological Office, 2014
17 The need for continual evaluation of the network set-up, and for maximising efficiency
and  communication,  internationally  became  clear  and,  consequently,  the  network
structure  entered  a  phase  of  rapid  change,  designing,  enforcing  and  enhancing
monitoring and response procedures.
 
Partnerships and inter-agency trust
18 European-wide projects such as FutureVolc (2014) the Volcanic Ash Scientific Advisory
Group (World Meteorological Organisation, 2015), and UK initiatives such as the Natural
Hazards Partnership (2013), have worked to improve communication in response to the
eruptions  of  Eyjafjallajökull  (2010),  Grímsvötn  (2011),  and  Bárðarbunga  (2014).  One
outcome  has  been  an  increase  in  “inter-agency  trust” (Doyle  et  al.,  2015,  10),  formed
through the collaborative practices that coordinate actions between agencies, improve
the distribution  of  co-produced  knowledge,  and  enhance  the  provision  of  technical
resources (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. An organisational agency map visualising the knowledge networks and relationships
between different agencies.
Arrows indicate the main communication pathways for hazard data, information and
advice
19 Such  continuing  partnerships,  and  exercises  such  as  VOLCICE, influence  network
evolution by developing trust,  consolidating inter-agency relations,  and changing the
actions and responsibilities of individual stakeholders (Yates and Paquette, 2011; Doyle et
al.,  2015).  Iceland’s  resulting  web of  inter-agency  connections  emerged,  largely,  as  a
reaction  to  volcanic  events  (Figure  4);  this  network  is  a  complex  of  emerging
communication  channels;  these  are  tailored,  locally,  to  a  relatively  small  but
interconnected  society  with  rich  understandings  of  science  and  high  accessibility  to
hazard  information  and,  internationally,  to  a  plethora  of  agency  partnerships  and
policies.
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Figure 4. A timeline indicating the evolution of agency relationships in relation to volcanic events.
 
Methods
20 The study adopted a mixed methods approach, incorporating semi-structured interviews
and participant observations, which provided scope to integrate an array of stakeholders
from contrasting backgrounds across the network. According to Nightingale (2003) and
Fielding (2012), mixed methods allow for greater flexibility in collecting and interpreting
findings. This approach enabled exploration of both the scientific and social credentials
of the network’s structure, processes and evolutions. The research involved two fieldwork
sessions: 
21 • March-April 2014: Five weeks spent in Iceland, during which 37 interviews (Table 1) and
3 observations (Table 4)  were conducted in Reykjavík,  Vík í  Mýrdal  (Vík) and Höfn í
Hornafirði (Höfn).
 
Table 1. Interview Information Sources (Iceland).
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22 •  August  and  October  2014:  Two  week-long  periods  spent  in  the  UK  conducting  13
interviews (Table 2) and 2 observations (Table 4). 
 
Table 2. Interview Information Sources (UK).
23 • Between these fieldwork explorations, 14 Skype interviews were conducted online with
stakeholders that could not be reached in person (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Skype Interview Information Sources. 
24 Interviews and observations were not conducted in crisis settings, and largely took place
at  a  time  of  relative  quiescence  in  Iceland,  when the  only  notable  issue  was  media
speculation about a potential volcanic event at the stratovolcano, Hekla. Of course, this
study would have been difficult to conduct during a crisis as those involved would likely
have been too busy to contribute. However, participant observations were conducted in
the context of simulation exercises, which showed the patterns of communication upon
which the network is constructed. The UK fieldwork was undertaken during the eruption
of Bárðarbunga but this was considered largely irrelevant to UK based agencies at the
time.  Information  was  sourced  from  stakeholders  with  a  range  of  scientific,  social,
political and economic backgrounds. The lens of interpretation was not dismissive of the
natural  sciences  but  analysis  is  positioned  from  a  sociological  perspective.  The
background of the researcher in using geographical and sociological frameworks, such as
social constructivism (Stirling, 2008; Bijker et al., 2012) and ANT (Latour, 1999, 2005), was
not shared by most interviewees. However, the mixed methods approach provided the




25 64 semi-structured interviews were conducted and were targeted initially at personnel
within the IMO, Icelandic Civil Protection, Isavia and University of Iceland (UoI); the IMO
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and UoI research and monitor volcanic activity, whereas the Civil Protection are more
closely  aligned with exchanging knowledge with the  general  public.  Interviews were
conducted with the leaders or coordinators of these agencies, with questions designed to
encourage interviewees to identify further stakeholders who they regularly communicate
with, or who play a significant role in the monitoring or response process. Networking
with  these  stakeholders  helped  explore  connectivity.  The  close-knit  communities  of
stakeholders made networking relatively problem-free, but replicating this method in
less transparent networks would be challenging. Agency headquarters in Reykjavík were
the original research site, before extending to the communities of Vík and Höfn, and
agencies based in the UK. Problems regarding interviewee availability resulted in the
need to carry out some interviews via Skype. A Dictaphone was used to record interviews;
if the interviewee objected, then notes were taken in a field diary.
26 Interviews were often carried out in academic or workplace environments, but also took
place  in  public  or  domestic  locations.  For  anonymity,  only  the  agency to  which the
interviewee belonged was referenced. Interview durations varied from twenty minutes to
two hours, when the semi-structured format provoked in-depth discussion of evolving
stakeholder connections. Sensitivity sometimes needed to be exercised, particularly when
discussing the political implications of Eyjafjallajökull. Interviews tended to begin with
questions targeting the interviewee’s roles, expertise and agency set-up. The second part
asked more open-ended questions, which probed interactions, mitigation partnerships,
opinions on the use of social media, links to agencies in the UK, previous experiences of
volcanic crises, and uses of monitoring or response equipment. The final part drew upon
how the network and the position of the interviewee within it, was likely to evolve. 
 
Participant observation
27 Three observations were conducted in Iceland, with a further two in the UK (Table 4).
Each observation involved shadowing stakeholders and noting their interactions and uses
of technology. Icelandic observations took place prior to the Bárðarbunga eruption, with
the UK-based observations taking place following its onset. The duration of observations
varied depending upon the exercise or activity, for example, an observation of VOLCICE
took place over seven hours at the IMO and Isavia, whereas an observation of seismic
monitoring equipment at the IMO took only one hour (Table 4). Observations generally
took place in agency headquarters and exercise settings, with the only exception being
the Meteorological Office Civil Contingencies Aircraft (MOCCA) at Bournemouth Airport.
Before an observation took place, each of the stakeholders known to be participating,
were made aware of the research aims and intentions.  During observations,  informal
exchanges  with  stakeholders  were  initiated,  and,  if  given  permission,  these  were
recorded on a Dictaphone; questions were asked in order to penetrate the participant’s
thoughts,  opinions and explanations of what was being observed, often in relation to
understandings of  how the network is  shaped,  or  where communication takes place.
Many observed actions could not be orally recorded, so timings, communications and
uses of technology were noted in a field diary.
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Table 4. Participant Observation Information Sources.
 
Methodology of analysis
28 Each  interview  and  observation  was  transcribed  from the  Dictaphone  or  field  diary
following the fieldwork,  and transcriptions  were stored electronically.  Transcriptions
were  forwarded  to  participants  who  requested  a  copy  and  they  were  given  the
opportunity to remove information deemed unsuitable. Before the data was assessed, a
thematic analysis was carried out, using an NVivo software package (Bazeley and Jackson,
2013).  Analysing the results proved challenging due to the large quantity of data but
transcripts  were  coded  according  to  interactions  between  stakeholder  communities,
opinions of emerging technologies, and representations of trust. Here, direct quotations
from  interviews  and  observations  have  been  selected  to  illustrate  stakeholder
interactions,  demonstrate  communication  processes  and  illustrate  perceptions  of
network evolution. Further analysis involved the incorporation of theoretical frameworks
such as ANT (Latour, 1993) and Social Constructivism (Bijker et al., 2012) to explain inter-




29 Interviews  and  participant  observations  illustrated  evolutions  in  the  key  trends  and
aspects  of  Iceland’s  hazard network.  Findings show how partnerships and simulation
exercises affect inter-agency trust, the use of social media and crowdsourcing, and the
flexibility of the network’s decision-making.
 
The development of partnerships and inter-agency trust since
Eyjafjallajökull (2010)
30 Interviewees  describe  the  Eyjafjallajökull  eruption  in  2010  as  an  event  that  caused
agencies to interact to a much greater extent, encouraging the formation of domestic and
international partnerships: 
“Before 2010 I had no idea who was working at the London VAAC, but everything
changed and the UK are now our partners,  they have several people within the
government who are involved.” (UoI, 2014)
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31 Interviews with IMO coordinators confirmed how the eruption strengthened interactions
and led to a closer binding of the IMO and the London VAAC (2014). They note how the
lack of clear boundaries between, and flexible structures of, Icelandic agencies, such as
the IMO and the Civil Protection, enabled them to collaborate and overlap their actions
with others in the network, including the London VAAC and Isavia. Interviewees from the
UoI claimed that “in the aftermath of Eyjafjallajökull” (UoI, 2014), interagency partnerships
such  as  FutureVolc  did  more  to  incorporate  UK  agencies  and  bring  them  in  from
previously  marginal  roles.  The  FutureVolc  project  was  a  recurrent  theme  and
interviewees from the IMO and the UoI  were particularly keen to discuss  its  role  in
constructing  a  single  repository  from  which  stakeholders  from  social  and  scientific
backgrounds could source hazard information:
“FutureVolc is about merging information from different techniques, and coming
up with a general model or dataset to bring that information forward to everyone.”
(UoI, 2014)
32 The vast scope of the FutureVolc project was emphasised to illustrate its relevance to the
whole network. Interviewees from the UoI also argued that the provision of accessible
information had enhanced inter-agency trust, both in Iceland and overseas. Observation
of the VOLCICE exercise substantiated such improvements, when a participant was asked
a question regarding teamwork, it became apparent that the repetition of these exercise
had evolved new practises, cultures and interdependencies among the three participating
agencies (IMO, London VAAC and Isavia):
“We are trying to make sure that we are engaging with each other effectively and
regularly so that we get the best results.” (London VAAC 2014)
33 Experience and familiarity had been gained from the exercise, which became apparent in
the debrief that followed. Occasional tensions may remain between the agencies involved,
but the exercise played an important role in consolidating connectivity. 
 
Impacts of social media and crowdsourcing prior to Bárðarbunga
(2014)
34 Interviews with the IMO, and communities such as Vík, suggested that social media had
enabled information to be communicated fluidly and transparently and many agencies
feel that social media will continue expanding:
“People are creating real-time blogs of earthquake’s read by the IMO and tweeting
them, I certainly think social media has a lot of potential.” (Civil Protection, 2014)
35 Interviews with the public in Höfn also suggest an appreciation of the use of social media
by the IMO, adding that it helped create a sense of empowerment. Whilst not referred to
explicitly, it would appear that social media is perceived to shift the power-balance. For
example, farmers in Southern Iceland claimed that, through social media, they were able,
proactively, to distribute information to the IMO in the form of photographs and live
updates.  The eruption of Bárðarbunga in 2014 effectively illustrated this evolution of
social media use:
36 “Social  media  has  enabled  us  (IMO)  to  create  connections  between  people  and
organisations that didn’t exist” (IMO, 2014).
37 Many interviewees also referred to the unifying effect of  the IMO and Iceland’s Civil
Protection’s expanding use of “tools” (IMO 2014) such as Facebook. However, there are
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concerns  amongst  some  interviewees  about  the  quality  and  excessive  quantity  of
information shared via social media.
“The problems are how you are going to deal with all that data coming in… if you
get ten thousand pictures instead of one, how can you leverage that in a simple
way?.” (Civil Protection, 2014)
38 Despite such concerns, most interviewees felt that social media platforms were valuable
tools. 
39 Similarly, crowdsourcing has also expanded public involvement, with the Civil Protection
describing it as “a completely new reality” (2014). Scientists from the IMO were eager to
convey its positive impacts:
“We are based in Reykjavik and barely in the field, we have people in the areas at
risk, so we have started crowdsourcing to monitor what is happening, they send us
photographs.” (IMO, 2014)
40 Crowdsourcing  allows  agencies  to  access  the  expertise  of  affected  communities  and,
interviewees claim, its use during Eyjafjallajökull has led to its expansion within Iceland.
However, some interviewees at the UoI and the IMO cautioned against exaggerating its
efficiency:
“Crowdsourcing is dependent on how quickly those at the site of the hazard can
share photographs with you, and how quickly you can convert the evidence into
models.” (UoI, 2014)
41 Many  interviewees,  while  positive  to  the  idea,  acknowledged  the  limitations  and
dependencies associated with the increased use of crowdsourcing in Iceland. 
 
Evolutions in decision-making practices influenced by
Eyjafjallajökull (2010)
42 Most  of  the  evolutionary  changes  outlined  so far  are  linked  to  improvements  in
connectivity between scientific experts and end-users. However, the process of decision-
making has also changed with many interviewees reporting an increasingly distributed
practice since the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull, particularly within the aviation industry:
“We (Isavia) are losing the responsibility of keeping the aircraft safe from volcanic
ash,  with  decisions  being  taken by  air  traffic  control  and the  airlines  instead.”
(Isavia, 2014)
43 This  transference of  responsibility  and decision-making was  encouraged by the  2010
eruption, when flaws in the previous set-up became apparent. Subsequently, the role of
both Isavia and the aviation authorities transitioned from decision-maker to advisor:
“We (Isavia)  are obliged to provide information,  but we have less  responsibility
because the airlines make the decisions.” (Isavia, 2014)
44 Beyond the aviation industry, decision-making has become further distributed as a result
of  community  involvement,  a  process  that  began  before  Eyjafjallajökull,  when  some
farmers in Southern Iceland were given the decision-making power to decide whether or
not to evacuate before the eruption. The IMO acknowledge this transition:
“The  more  people  you  include,  the  broader  the  system,  and  this  is  why  any
interpretation  of  decision-making  should  be  viewed  as  a  process  built  on  open
communication, it is very important for the people at the site to be a part of the
decision-making.” (IMO, 2014)
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45 In general, the distribution of decision-making powers has changed the role of scientists,
particularly in Iceland where, the Civil Protection, working with municipal authorities,
acts as the main domestic decision-making agency.
 
Discussion
46 These  results  document  the  evolution  of  a  hazard  mitigation  network  through  the
construction of collaborative relationships and co-production of knowledge relating to
volcanic events. 
Trust in inter-agency response management
47 Joint exercises involving new technology have generally improved levels of inter-agency
trust, constructing interactions that did not previously exist (Salas et al., 1994). Following
Jasanoff’s (2004) approach to constructivism, partnerships, projects and advisories have
provided  an  invisible  fabric  that  consolidated  inter-agency  collaboration  in  Iceland.
Similar evolutions are exemplified through “community-based disaster  risk  management”
(Barclay et al., 2008, p. 169) and the processes that created the Volcanic Science Advisory
Group (Doyle et al., 2015, p.2; London VAAC, 2014). In addition, the “one trusted source”
(Doyle, 2015, p. 3) for hazard information, evident through projects such as FutureVolc
(2014), has helped to cultivate a coherent approach. In Iceland, such sources have been
the result of the Eyjafjallajökull eruption, referred to as a “Black Swan event” (Doyle et al.,
2015,  p.  23).  Connections  had  to  be  established,  a  process  eased  in  Iceland  by  the
network’s high density of agencies, projects, partnerships and advisories. However, even
in a highly interconnected network, disconnects can occur in a time of crisis, particularly
between  agencies  constructed  at  different  scales  (Doyle  et  al.,  2015).  The  increasing
contribution of UK-based agencies has meant increased flexibility, but also complexity in
the network, so greater collaboration is required for trust to be maintained. The role
played  by  technology  in  furthering  communication  and  flexibility  echoes  Latour’s
interpretation of technical devices in ANT (Latour, 1993). 
48 Temporality  is  also  important  in  inter-agency  trust  since  trust  emerges  from  the
construction of situational awareness amongst response agencies. Situational awareness
is  “highly  temporal  in  nature”  (Endsley,  1994,  p.  32)  and part  of  a  “temporally  dynamic
process” (Companion, 1994, p.285). The creation of shared mental models is important in
constructing  inter-agency  trust.  There  needs  to  be  an  “understanding  of  each  other’s
knowledge, skills, roles, anticipated behaviour or needs” (Doyle et al., 2015, p. 7), something
that can only develop incrementally with time and regular contact. A final consideration
in constructing inter-agency trust relates to the prominence of open access data, which
has become a socially constructed expectation amongst response agencies and the wider
community. Barclay et al. gives an example of the merits of open access data, by detailing
the openness, transparency and trust that results from “deliberative and inclusive processes”
(DIPs) (Barclay et al., 2008, p. 172):
“DIPs can help volcanic risk reduction efforts by increasing trust, by encouraging
open deliberations of scientific uncertainty by those likely to be most effective, and
by drawing attention to the issues.” (Barclay et al., 2008, p. 73)
49 Whilst  there  are  conflicting  definitions,  the  impact  of  open  access  data  upon  the
reinforcement of trust among expert advisors, particularly scientists, is unquestionable.
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The Icelandic network shows how open access data compliments inter-agency trust by
widening access to hazard information, a process further encouraged here by the use of
innovative technology. 
 
Social media and crowdsourcing: translating hazard information
50 The key role of social media and crowdsourcing, in the evolution of hazard management
practises  in Iceland,  has  itself  changed since Eyjafjallajökull.  Previously,  Sutton et  al.
(2008) and Yates and Paquette (2011) noted the enhanced connectivity of networks that
resulted from the use of social media during and following the 2007 wildfires in Southern
California  and  the  2010  Haiti  earthquake.  Others  have  highlighted  the  value  of
“Volunteered Geographic Information” (VGI) (Dransch et al.,  2013),  and its use during
hazardous  events  including  the  Haiti,  Canterbury  (Doyle  et  al.,  2015),  and  Nepal
(Sanderson  &  Ramalingam,  2015)  earthquakes,  and  the  Tohoku  tsunami  (Peary  et  al.,
2012). Iceland’s Bárðarbunga volcanic event presented a special opportunity to study the
role  of  social  media.  Here,  the  collaboration  between  the  IMO  and  Civil  Protection,
through the simultaneous use of Facebook to distribute hazard maps and daily update
reports, illustrated greater coherence. As Sutton et al. suggested:
“Agency and use of  technology and the social  structures that support them are
mutually reinforcing.” (Sutton et al., 2008, p. 630)
51 The structure of the Icelandic network enabled social media and crowdsourcing to impact
upon the sharing of knowledge between and beyond official agencies. Zook et al. (2010)
illustrated the value of crowdsourcing in the relief effort that followed the 2010 Haiti
earthquake, where VGI helped “to bridge the gap between those on the ground in Haiti and
those who are far away, but eager to help” (Zook et al., 2010, p. 18). This reasoning mirrors
that in Iceland’s IMO and the Civil Protection, who have begun using VGI to reduce the
communicative  distance between  agency  headquarters  in  Reykjavik  and  affected
communities at the site of the hazard. 
52 Social media and VGI improve the exposure of hazard information and establish common
ground between agencies such as the IMO, UoI and Civil Protection. Social media can
improve  the  “knowledge  management”  (Yates  and  Paquette,  2011,  p.  7) of  agencies  in
Iceland in the same way as it enhanced the coordination of response agencies and the US
government  after  the  2010  Haiti  earthquake.  Communication has  become both more
diverse and extensive through the utilisation of “backchannels” (Sutton et al., 2008, p. 624)
that allow for the real-time distribution of photographic, cartographic and descriptive
evidence of volcanic activity. This supports the claim by Zook et al. (2010) that hazard
network’s  benefit  from  multiple  means  of  effective  communication.  Co-produced
knowledge  has  resulted  from  social  media  contributions  that  represent  hazard
information  from  both  scientific  and  social  perspectives.  Once  communicated,  such
information can be translated and mediated by different end-users, (cf. Latour, 1994). For
example, during the 2014 eruption of Bárðarbunga, guidance notices posted on Facebook
by the IMO and the Civil Protection represented knowledge that had been translated from
models such as NAME. Translation removed the quantitative purity of modelled data, but
its communication pathways are traceable through “likes” on Facebook and “retweets” on
Twitter, making agency and stakeholder connections more identifiable (Bruns & Burgess,
2012). 
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Distributed decision-making: transforming knowledge and action
53 The  evolving  structure  of  Iceland’s  hazard  network  following  Eyjafjallajökull  has
transformed decision-making by changing the position of nodal points,  where hazard
information  is  exchanged,  and  the  responsibilities  of  agencies  are  determined.  A
constructivist  interpretation  could  attribute  such  changes  to  the  influence  and
innovation of technology (Jasanoff, 2004), such as the Google Crisis Response platform
(Gibson et al., 2015). However, an ANT approach could view changes in decision-making
through  the  distinction  between  stakeholders  with  a  mediating  role  (whereby  their
actions determine the decisions taken), and the intermediaries that communicate with
them  to  provide  or  source  information  (Latour,  1994).  Through  coordination  and
teamwork, such distinctions can be blurred as the scale of the hazard is often ambiguous
and actors are less clearly defined, challenging the boundaries of agencies such as the
IMO and the Civil Protection. Paton et al. (1998, p. 6) claim:
“The scale of hazard impact and its multi-jurisdictional implications also signal a
need to explore the use of distributed decision-making procedures.”
54 Recent  transformations in the aviation industry exemplify  the impact  that  scale  and
jurisdiction  have  had  upon  decision-making  distributions.  Latour’s  ANT  approach
suggests that, while aviation authorities such as Isavia in Iceland and the CAA in the UK
were previously viewed as mediators, due to their responsibility to open or close airspace
in response to volcanic activity, this role has since been renegotiated. Their decision-
making responsibilities have been passed to individual airlines, resulting in the process
becoming  more  distributed,  and  the  aviation  authorities  being  downgraded  from
decision-makers to intermediary advisors. 
55 The process  of  translating hazard information has  also  energised the  distribution of
decision-making (Latour, 1999). For example, the UK based Scientific Advisory Group for
Emergencies now translate quantitative data from the NAME modelling system into a
summary  representing  the  information  in  both  qualitative  and  quantitative  terms.
Translation co-produces knowledge and aids a range of decision-makers with different
decision-making  needs,  for  example,  airline  personnel,  risk  management  strategists,
politicians,  etc.  Whilst  a  “memorandum of  understanding”  (Dash et  al.,  2013,  p.  57)  can
provide  stability  in  decision-making,  in  exercises  such as  VOLCICE,  changes  in  the
responsibilities  of  external  agencies  show  how  network  roles,  connections  and
stakeholder  positions  can evolve (Latour,  2005).  The ambiguity  of  decision-making is
further highlighted through the significance of “boundary spanners” (Owen et al., 2013, p.
9); in  complex  networks,  the  overlapping  actions  of  different  response  agencies
continually question the legitimacy of the attribution of decision-making responsibilities.
 
Conclusions
56 Iceland’s volcanic hazard network lacks a clear boundary between society and science. It
is characterised by the mergence of stakeholders from contrasting agencies, communities
and  technologies.  The  use  of  sociological  narratives  provides  interdisciplinary
frameworks that help assess the power dynamics and configuration of such a network
and also highlight the role of technical innovation and trust in knowledge co-production,
coherence  and collaboration.  This  has  been demonstrated  through the  evaluation of
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changes  in  inter-agency  trust,  the  use  of  social  media  and  crowdsourcing,  and  the
distribution  of  decision-making,  between  the  eruptions  of  Eyjafjallajökull  (2010)  and
Bárðarbunga (2014). Despite the size of Iceland’s network, these conclusions remain case
and context specific.  They may not be reflective of  networks in more politically and
demographically challenging areas.
57 However, key conclusions are:
• The attention attributed to the Eyjafjallajökull eruption in 2010, and the flaws within the
network, led to a greater distribution of decision-making power, particularly in the aviation
industry. Technical innovation and enhanced levels of trust were contributing factors to this
transformation thanks to improved situational awareness amongst agencies and the wider
translation of data by stakeholders.
• The setting up of partnerships and expert advisories, following the Eyjafjallajökull eruption,
and their continuation through the volcanic episode at Bárðarbunga, reinforced levels of
inter-agency trust. This was abetted by technical innovation that improved the connectivity
and communication between Icelandic and UK based agencies, with open access data being a
significant factor. 
• The rapid expansion and diversification of social media use and crowdsourcing between the
Eyjafjallajökull  and  Bárðarbunga  eruptions  transformed  communication  channels  and
reduced  the  distance  between  affected  communities  and  the  agencies  monitoring  or
responding to volcanic activity. Such emerging technologies continue to further VGI and
mobilise  different  stakeholder  communities,  improving  communication,  whilst  also
enhancing trust and transparency.
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ABSTRACTS
Digital and virtual communication impacts increasingly upon the management of natural
hazards in an uncertain world, challenging the boundaries between science and society.  This
study uses sociological theory to explore how technology reduces the mitigation failures and
conflicts that scholars often disproportionately prioritise; it also evaluates the evolution of nodal
points  between  communicating  stakeholders  in  a  complex  hazard  management  network.
Technical  innovation  has  reshaped  Iceland’s  approach  to  mitigating  risks  associated  with
volcanic  events;  interconnections  between  stakeholders  within  the  network  evolve  through
technical innovation and the forming of collaborative engagements that renegotiate the roles
and  responsibilities  of  monitoring  and  response  agencies.  Interviews  and  participant
observations, with agencies including the Icelandic Meteorological Office, evidence the impact of
network evolution upon social media use, inter-agency trust, the expansion of crowdsourcing,
and increasingly distributed decision-making frameworks.
La communication numérique et virtuelle impacte de plus en plus la gestion des risques naturels
dans un monde instable, défiant les frontières entre science et société. Notre étude étudie, sous
l'angle  de  la  sociologie,  comment  la  technologie  contribue  à  réduire  les  défaillances  et  les
divergences en la matière, auxquels se réfèrent trop souvent les scientifiques. Nous analysons
également l'évolution des points nodaux entre les acteurs de la communication à l'intérieur d'un
réseau complexe de gestion des  risques.  En Islande les  progrès  technologiques  ont  remodelé
l'approche  de  l'atténuation  des  risques  associés  aux  événements  volcaniques.  Les
interconnexions entre acteurs du réseau évoluent en fonction des innovations techniques et du
développement d'engagements de collaboration qui renégocient les rôles et les responsabilités
des organismes de contrôle et d'intervention. Les interviews et les observations des différents
organismes, y compris l'Office météorologique d'Islande, démontrent l'impact de l'évolution du
réseau sur  l'utilisation des  médias  sociaux,  la  collaboration entre  organismes,  l'extension du
"crowdsourcing", et la répartition croissante des cadres décisionnels.
INDEX
Mots-clés: coproduction, réseau, risques volcaniques, réseaux sociaux, coopération inter-
organismes, Islande
Keywords: co-production, network, volcanic hazards, social media, inter-agency trust, Iceland
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